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Situating frames and institutional logics:  
The social situation as a key institutional micro-foundation 
Santi Furnari, Cass Business School, City, University of London 
 
RUNNING HEAD: situating frames and institutional logics 
 
Research on institutional logics has highlighted the importance of social situations but has not 
theorized such situations in a way that takes into account their inherent richness, complexity 
and unpredictability. Without a theory of social situations, the connection between logics and 
people’s everyday life experience is incomplete, resulting in fragile micro-foundations. 
Building on Goffman (1974) and the institutional logics perspective, in this essay I sketch an 
institutional theory of social situations, distinguishing two components of these situations: 
situational experience and situated interactions. Situational experience is constituted by 
situational frames –i.e. schemas by which a person can perceive others and interpret the 
source of their agency in a situation. Multiple situational frames are simultaneously present in 
any situation, offering various potentials for action. Institutional logics shape the content that 
situational frames take in different institutional orders, providing rules for interacting 
appropriately in typified situations. However, the actual interactions unfolding in a given 
social situation do not necessarily conform to situational frames, but rather can transform 
those frames in unpredictable ways through interaction rituals and frame keyings. I contrast 
this situated perspective with the cognitivist notion that people ‘activate’ or re-combine pre-
existing aspects of logics depending on the situation. I argue that a situated perspective better 
accounts for the generative and transformative potential of micro-interactions. 
 
Keywords: institutional logics; frames; inhabited institutions; practice-driven 
institutionalism; symbolic interactionism; Goffman; situation.  
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Introduction  
Since its origin, the construct of institutional logic was developed with an explicit 
micro-foundational agenda: to locate human behaviour in societal context by highlighting its 
mutually constitutive relationship with institutions and their underlying logics (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991: 242). In fact, the very definition of institutional logics as ‘the material practices 
and symbolic categories by which humans conduct their material life and give meaning to it’ 
(cf. Thornton and Ocasio, 1999: 804) puts at centre stage people’s everyday life experience. 
Yet, perhaps due to the rapid upsurge of research on institutional logics (see Ocasio, 
Thornton and Lounsbury, 2017 for review), scholars’ portrayals of logics have become 
somehow detached from people’s everyday life experience, sometimes conjuring the image 
of ‘free floating’ cultural templates that are disembodied and disconnected from people’s 
everyday life (Lok, Creed, De Jordy & Voronov, 2017).  
 My over-arching argument in this essay is two-fold. First, I submit that a robust 
theory of how logics connect with human behaviour needs to strengthen the conceptual link 
between logics and people’s everyday life experience. Second, I argue that one way to forge 
such a link is to develop a notion of social situations that takes simultaneously into account 
people’s complex experience of ‘being in a social situation’ and institutional logics’ influence 
over social situations. By ‘social situation’ I mean a temporally and physically bounded, 
here-and-how, episode of social interaction (Goffman 1967; Collins, 2004). A social situation 
is therefore ‘the bounded social entity most immediate to the individual’s experience, within 
which his/her mundane affairs with others occur’ (Gonos, 1977: 854). My arguments are in 
line with an inhabited institutions approach (e.g. Hallett & Ventresca, 2006), practice-driven 
institutionalism (e,g. Smets, Aristidou, & Whittington, 2017; Furnari, 2014; Lounsbury & 
Crumley, 2007) and recent works linking logics with people’s emotions and lived 
experiences (Voronov & Weber, 2016; Lok et al., 2017; Zietsma & Toubiana, 2018). 
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The social situation has been already acknowledged as an important factor in 
Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012)’s seminal model of the micro-foundations of 
institutional logics (thereafter TOL model). In this model, individuals are envisioned as 
‘activating’ selected aspects of the institutional logics into which they have been socialized, 
depending on the characteristics of the situation. Specifically, the activation of logics depends 
on the ‘situational fit’ between the applicability of the cultural knowledge embodied in the 
logics and the salient aspects of the situation (Thornton et al., 2012: 16). While this model 
unpacked key mechanisms connecting logics and individual behaviour, it also relied on a 
simplified notion of social situations. In particular, the model did not directly examine 
people’s definition of the situation, an element identified by micro-interactionist scholars as 
key to understand what’s going on in social situations (Goffman, 1974).  
Participating a social situation requires some form of shared situational experience 
among participants, allowing them to understand what a situation is about, in general terms, 
and what that specific situation they are encountering is about (Diehl and McFarland, 2010). 
The TOL model does not explicitly focus on situational experience, devoting limited 
attention to the sources of such experience and the processes by which people reach a 
definition of the situation. In fact, the cognitivist language of ‘situational fit’ points to a rather 
objectified notion of situations as containers to which logics can be applied ‘from the 
outside’. This notion reduces the inherent richness, complexity and unpredictability of social 
situations, black-boxing their inner workings and obscuring their link with logics. As a result, 
the role of situated micro-interactions in the TOL model is relatively limited: interactions can 
either ‘activate’ (or not) different pre-existing aspects of institutional logics. This ‘activation’ 
language stands in contrast with people’s everyday experience of social interactions as highly 
contingent and unpredictable streams of events, often ripe with what Goffman (1974) called 
the ‘bizarre potentials of social life’ (p. 15).  
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To overcome these limitations, I develop a notion of social situations that gives justice 
to their inherent richness, complexity, and unpredictability while simultaneously taking into 
account how institutional logics are a key source of order and meaning in social situations. 
My point of departure is that people are socialized into institutional logics through social 
situations. As people experience and interact in different kinds of situations in the course of 
their life, they start recognizing how situations differ (or are similar) in terms of their 
institutional specificity. They learn that different ‘typified situations’ set apart an institutional 
order from another (cf. Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Weber & Voronov, 2016; Weber 
&Glynn, 2006). For example, they learn in what ways a ‘family lunch’ situation differs from, 
and is similar to, a ‘professional lunch’ situation. Importantly, these typified situations are 
learned not as near-decomposable modular systems of knowledge, as the cognitivist TOL 
model assumes (p. 59-60), but as holistic gestalts of layered situational frames (Diehl and 
McFarland, 2010).  
If frames define the schemata of interpretation that people use to locate events in the 
world (Goffman, 1974: 21), situational frames more specifically refer to the schemas that 
people use to interpret others’ behaviour in a social situation by locating the sources of their 
agency. Building on Goffman (1974), I focus on two such situational frames: 1) role frame, 
through which a person reads others’ behaviour in terms of role demands; 2) character frame, 
through which a person reads others’ behaviour in terms of expressing emotions and stylized 
aspects of their selves. These frames are always layered on top of each other in any situation 
of interaction and are thus always simultaneously co-present and available for interpretation, 
if only latently, in any situation. They are latent potentials for situated interaction.  
The typified situations that people learn through their socialization into different 
institutional orders are thus gestalts of role and character frames –i.e. recipes for interacting 
in, and reading through, institutionally-specific situations. By providing the cultural content 
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that these recipes or situational gestalts can take, institutional logics guide and condition 
situated interaction. Although conditioning, logics do not determine the social interactions 
unfolding in a specific situation at a given time and place. Through their situated interactions 
people can reproduce the typified patterns of interaction inscribed into situational frames, but 
they can also transform such frames through the process of interaction itself. For example, 
some of the roles and characters perceived to be displayed in interaction may induce shared 
emotional energy and mutual attention among interactants (Collins, 2004), which can in turn 
generate a new definition and understanding of the situation that was not available to the 
interactants through the typified situations in which they had been socialized (Furnari, 2014).  
I leverage Collins (2004)’s ideas about interaction ritual chains and Goffman (1974)’s 
ideas about keyings to provide some illustrations of this transformative potential of situated 
micro-interactions. From this vantage point, situated behaviour does not depend on which 
aspects of logics ‘fit the situation’, but on which role and character frames, out of the ones 
available in an institutionally-constituted situation, become eventually sustained through the 
process of interaction itself. It is the inherent relational nature of inter-action –as something 
that happens in-between two or more people- that makes the interaction process ripe with 
transformative potential and surprises. 
This essay is structured in five sections. First, I summarize the tenets of the TOL 
model and its scope limitations to understand social situations. I use this model as a point of 
comparison to illustrate my different notion of social situations. I chose this model because it 
includes social situations as a key part of logics’ micro-foundations and it is the most 
systematic theorization of such micro-foundations to date. Second, I identify two components 
of a social situation (situational experience and situated interactions) and conceptualize 
situational experience as a gestalt of two layered situational frames. Third, I argue that 
people’s socialization into different institutional orders and its logics is a key source of these 
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situational frames. Fourth, I discuss how the interactions taking place in a given social 
situation can transform situational frames via interaction rituals and frame keyings. Fifth, I 
discuss the implications of my arguments for research on the micro-foundations of 
institutional logics.  
 
Micro-foundations of institutional logics: are social situations missing in action? 
Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury (2012) developed the first, fully-fledged model of 
individual behaviour that accounts for both the constraining and enabling role of institutional 
logics on human attention, cognition and action. Their model assumes that individual 
behaviour is intentional –i.e. guided by an individual’s identities and goals (March and Olsen, 
1989)- and rationally bounded –i.e. constrained by cognitive schemas (Simon, 1955). 
Another key assumption is that an individual’s identities, goals and schemas are embedded in 
institutional logics: an individual can understand and construct her own identities, goals and 
schemas only from within the multiple logics in which she has been socialized (Friedland and 
Alford, 1991). Thus, any given individual is assumed to have multiple institutionally-shaped 
identities, goals and schemas, because throughout their lives any human is socialized –to 
different degrees- into multiple institutional orders and their associated logics.  
Based on these assumptions, Thornton et al. (2012) developed the ‘availability-
accessibility-activation’ model, arguing that an individual’s behaviour in a given situation 
can be explained as a function of: 1) the multiple institutional logics that are available in the 
individual’s mind through her previous socialization; 2) the subset of the available logics that 
are accessible (i.e. come to mind) to the individual in the specific situation; 3) the logics, 
among the accessible ones, that are activated (i.e. concretely used in action) by the individual 
in the specific situation. The activated institutional logic(s) will then prompt one or more of 
the multiple available identities, goals and schemas associated with the available logics, thus 
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influencing individual behaviour in a given situation. Importantly, both the accessibility and 
activation of logics are shaped not only by logics’ availability, but also by ‘the characteristics 
of the situation’, where social situations are defined as “the immediate social context and 
interactions as well as [its] materials properties” (Thornton et al., 2012: 80). Social situations 
play a key role in shaping the activation of logics in a given situation: ‘which aspects of 
institutional logics are activated is contingent on the applicability of accessible knowledge 
structures [i.e. institutional logics] to salient aspects of the situation” (Thornton et al., 2012: 
16 [added]). Thus, the ‘situational fit’ between accessible institutional logics and the 
characteristics of the situation is a fundamental explanatory factor in the TOL model.  
But how is this ‘situational fit’ achieved? How do people come to understand and 
evaluate the ‘applicability of accessible logics to the characteristics of the situations’ that they 
experience in their lives? These questions are key to understand how logics influence 
individual behaviour. Three insights are provided to address these questions. First, the TOL 
model distinguishes between non-routine and routine situations (Ocasio, 2011) based on the 
salience of “unusual or expected actions and outcomes” compared to past situations 
(Thornton et al., 2012: 92). Under novel situations, less accessible (but still available) logics 
are predicted to be activated or re-combined. Second, some of the identities associated with 
certain logics are more likely to be accessible and activated across situations depending on 
the extent to which an individual’s social relations rest on those identities (McCall and 
Simmons, 1978). Third, identities can be verified through the social interactions and 
symbolic exchanges occurring in social situations (Stryker and Burke, 2000). While the TOL 
model has greatly contributed to the development of the micro-foundations of institutional 
logics, as shown by empirical and theoretical applications of this model (Pache and Santos, 
2013; McPherson and Sauder, 2013), this model is also limited in three key respects.  
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First, the model does not problematize people’s understanding and definition of the 
situation. As micro-interactionist research has long highlighted, the notion of ‘situation’ itself 
is problematic and shifty. Social situations are circumstances in which “the view that one 
person has of what is going on is likely to be quite different from that of another. There is a 
sense in which what is play for the golfer is work for the caddy” (Goffman, 1974: 8; emphasis 
added). Although we often think of situations as “something happening before the eyes of 
observers…..the crucial question of how a seeming agreement was reached concerning the 
identity of the “something” and the inclusiveness of “before the eyes” still remains” 
(Goffman, 1974: 9). In other words, the construct of situation presupposes some form of 
‘situational experience’ shared among interactants about what a situation is about (Diehl and 
McFarland, 2010). TOL (2012)’s model, however, does not directly focus on the question of 
how such situational experience can be achieved and whether the participants of a situation 
are assumed to ‘see’ the same situation in the same way or not.  
Second, it is not clear whether people’s understandings of the situation are assumed to 
be endogenous to the institutional orders and logics in which people are embedded or not. 
The cognitivist language of ‘situational fit’ seems to indicate that social situations are 
external to logics by depicting them as a ‘containers’ to which logics need to be ‘fitted in’. As 
a result, it is not clear how exactly logics shape the experience of the situation of interactants, 
an element that Goffman (1974) identified as key to understand situations and their micro-
interaction dynamics. Similarly, less attention is devoted to explain how such situational 
experience shape the availability, accessibility and activation of institutional logics in situ. 
 Third, the idea that social interactions and situations are triggers ‘activating’ 
institutional logics seem to reduce the inherent richness, complexity, ambiguity and 
unpredictability of social situations and the interactions happening in them. Social 
interactions do not just activate or re-combine existing cultural materials that pre-date them, 
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they can also more radically transform those materials (Gray, Ansari and Purdy, 2015). This 
more generative, and potentially transformative role of situations remains under-theorized in 
the TOL model. Differently, situations are mostly described as quite passive contexts that can 
‘fit’ (or not) with people’s cultural knowledge (logics), or as settings in which people can 
verify (or not) pre-existing social identities. Such imagery tends to depict social interactions 
as the sums or linear combinations of pre-existing elements rather than as fluid, non-linear 
streams of events in which something distinctively novel can, perhaps unpredictably, emerge 
(Strauss, 1993).  
In sum, although the TOL model acknowledges the role of social situations, it does 
not give full justice to what we know about social situations from micro-interactionist 
research –i.e. that they are richly textured, complex interaction settings often ripe with 
surprises. We need a more multi-dimensional conceptualization of social situations to take 
simultaneously into account people’s complex experience of being in a social situation and 
institutional logics’ influence over social situations.  
 
Two components of social situations: situational experience and situated interactions 
What goes on in a situation of social interaction? An answer to this question is 
essential to a robust conceptualization of social situations. Building on Goffman (1974) and 
Diehl and McFarland (2010)’s extension of his work, I argue that at least two distinct 
people’s activities ‘go on’ in a social situation: 1) people encountering the situation 
recognize, largely unconsciously and implicitly, the type of situation that they are 
encountering and such recognition induces a shared orientation among them; 2) people 
actually interact in the situation and such interactions may, more or less faithfully, replicate 
their pre-situational understanding of roles and relationships (i.e. their  recognition of the type 
of the situation) or deviate from such understanding, leading to an implicit re-negotiation of 
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the definition of the situation or to an explicit contest/conflict over it. These two activities can 
be thought as two components of a social situation or as “two distinct moments in situational 
interaction” (Diehl and McFarland, 2010: 1718). These moments are analytically distinct, for 
the benefit of conceptualization and analysis, but empirically they are overlapping and 
ongoing1.  
Importantly, the first moment of situational interaction implies the presence of some 
form of inter-subjective understanding among the interactants about the definition of the 
situation -i.e. “what is this situation about?”.  This inter-subjective understanding is what can 
be described as ‘situational experience’ and is inextricably connected with situated 
interactions: any situated interaction becomes understandable and meaningful only in relation 
to the shared background constituted by people’s inter-subjective understanding of what the 
situation is about. Thus, to understand how logics influence situated behavior, we first need 
to understand what this situational experience is, and how it can be conceptualized in a way 
that allows us to see the link between logics and social situations in more clear focus.  
 
Situational experience as gestalt of layered frames 
To capture situational experience, Goffman used the concept of ‘frame’, which he 
defined as the principles governing the subjective meanings we assign to events (Goffman, 
1974: 11). The concept of frame allows to address a key puzzle: if social situations are all 
seemingly different from one another, what explains people’s remarkable ability and ease in 
understanding what a specific situation is about? At its core, this question concerns how order 
and meaning emerges out of “the bizarre potentials of social life” (p. 15), the overwhelming 
                                                             
1 The distinction of these two ‘moments’ is reflected in micro-interactionist research at large. 
Indeed, this research implicitly or explicitly focuses on either the first moment, unpacking the 
formation of situational experience (e.g. Scheff, 1990)- or the second moment, investigating 
how actual interaction dynamics can change or validate situational experience (Collins, 2004; 
Summers-Eifler, 2002).  
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and often unpredictable flow of people’s everyday life experience. Goffman’s answer is that 
people’s apparent ‘naturalness’ in understanding situations actually derives from frames. 
Frames provide an organization to people’s experience of situations, making that experience 
meaningful and comparable across seemingly different situations.  
A core insight of Goffman’s theory is that any social situation can always be 
interpreted from multiple, connected frames simultaneously. Thus, multiple frames always 
co-exist in the same situation. It is this incessant co-existence of multiple, connected frames 
in any given situation that explains another key puzzle –i.e. the fact that people are able to see 
and interpret the same situation from many different perspectives but at the same time they 
usually experience that situation as a “seamless whole” or “gestalt” (Diehl and McFarland, 
2010: 1716). Consider a faculty meeting. One can interpret it as an empty institutionalized 
ceremony, a show-off of power by the head of faculty, an opportunity to gain visibility with 
colleagues, a technical meeting to fix practical problems, a social gathering. When a person 
participates a faculty meeting in a specific time and place, these different perspectives (or 
frames) are all simultaneously co-present and more or less latent, they are all there offering 
different potential lines for action and interaction in the situation. Yet, despite the multiplicity 
of these co-existing and inextricably interwoven layers of interpretation, we typically 
experience different types of situations as having their own distinctive “ethos” or “feeling” 
(Goffman, 1963: 19). This situational ‘character’ is experienced holistically by the person as 
a “gestalt” that can be often described with a synthetic shorthand adjective or noun.  
Although Goffman (1974: 269-286) and later extensions of his work (Diehl and 
McFarland, 2010) identify a variety of basic situational frames that together constitute 
situational experience, for reasons of space limitations in this essay I will focus on two of 
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these basic frames2: the role frame and the character frame. These situational frames define 
different ways in which people can perceive others’ agency in a social situation and thus 
interpret their behaviour.  
 
Role frame  
 Through the role frame, a person reads a situation in terms of the social roles involved 
in it. This frame locates the perceived source of actors’ agency within the social roles that 
they are enacting. Via a role frame, we understand ourselves and others as being motivated 
by role demands. Thus, our own and others’ situated behaviours are interpreted as oriented 
towards the goals and rules of appropriateness defined by certain roles (March and Olsen, 
1989). This frame is rooted in the culturally legitimate scripts and schemas for coordinated 
activity, providing “situationally contextualized means for people to coordinate activity” 
through the rules and expectations defined by roles (Diehl and McFarland, 2010: 1724) and 
therefore ensuring the understandability and predictability of situated interaction (Merton, 
1957). At the same time, even within routine situations involving well-known roles, people 
always enact roles with at least some minor modifications of the idealized template inscribed 
in the role. These modifications and adjustments can be best captured through the idea of 
character frames.   
 
Character frame   
 Through the character frame, a person reads a situation in terms of the ‘characters’ 
that can be performed in connection with the roles involved in the situation. “Characters” are 
intended here as stylized ways in which in a role can be enacted in terms of emotional 
                                                             
2 Goffman (1974) distinguished natural frames –which construe events as natural occurrences 
not mediated or guided by actors- and social frames –which describe events as resulting from 
human agency. Diehl and McFarland (2010) further elaborated this basic categorization.  
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displays and other forms of expressivity. Via the character frame, we understand others’ 
agency and behaviour as guided by impulsivity, creativity and emotions. The character frame 
is always “laminated” upon the role frame (Goffman, 1974) and there are at least two 
important ways in which these two frames are connected. First, the character frame can serve 
to reinforce the role frame upon which it is laminated. For example, Hochschild (1985)’s 
study of flight attendants’ display of emotions demonstrated how the successful enactment of 
certain roles requires the ‘injection of character’ (Diehl and McFarland, 2010) even if those 
emotional displays are artificial and intentionally fabricated. Second, the character frame 
allows persons to display others roles that are outside the specific role frame upon which the 
character is laminated as well as other “valued aspects of self and style not associated with 
the role” (Diehl and McFarland, 2010: 1725). Indeed, roles vary in the degree of latitude they 
offer for the display of behaviours not directly associated with the role. At the same time, 
over time a repertoire of character displays will become inscribed into some roles and this 
will largely depend on the institutional logics in which the interactants are embedded in, as 
illustrated below. 
 
Institutional logics and layered situational frames   
How are institutional logics linked with situational experience and its layered frames? 
The key is in the socialization process through which people become embedded into different 
institutional orders and learn their associated logics.  
People become socialized into institutional logics through situated social interactions. 
As people experience and interact in different kinds of situations in the course of their life, 
they start recognizing, situation after situation, how situations differ (or are similar) in terms 
of their institutional specificity. Through this process, people learn the different ‘types of 
situations’ –i.e. typified sets of roles, characters and their relationships- that characterize a 
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given institutional order. For example, they learn that the order of the family is constituted by 
specific types of situations such as family lunches and dinners, family trips, family 
celebrations such as Thanksgiving or Christmas, etc. That the order of democracy is 
characterized by types of situations such as politicians’ speeches on campaign trails, protests 
on the street, Election Day’s ballots, etc.  
A person apprehends each of these situations as a gestalt of layered role and character 
frames, so that she will intuitively know what roles and characters are available, for example, 
in a typical family situation, and in what ways those roles and characters can be related. The 
roles and characters –as well as their relations- constituting the types of situations that 
characterize an institutional order will be shaped by the institutional logic governing that 
order in a particular historical period. In sum, it is through a person’s socialization into a 
specific institutional order that the person learns the types of situations through which a logic 
manifests itself and the roles and characters available in those situations. 
Since “humans live across institutions” (Friedland and Alford, 1991: 255) and through 
their lives become socialized into multiple institutional orders (i.e. family, state, religion, 
democracy, community), people learn a variety of types of situations and their corresponding, 
inter-layered roles and characters. From this situated perspective, the multiple embeddedness 
of each person in a variety of institutional orders implies that each person has learned a 
variety of types of situations (roles, characters and their relations) and, through this process, 
develop an intuitive sense of when and how to behave in different orders3. It is this multitude 
                                                             
3 Through her socialization in multiple institutional orders, a person learns not only a variety of 
order-specific situational frames, but also acquires a sense of ‘what a situation is’ in general 
terms. She comes to understand what social interaction is about and what its basic 
constitutive components are. She learns that, no matter what institutional order a situation is 
located in, she can interpret others’ situated behaviour by reading their motivations and 
agency via role and character frames and that these frames are connected and co-exist in any 
situation. This understanding of “what a situation is” can be seen as a sort of meta-knowledge 
or procedural schema that is learned across institutional orders. 
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of institutionally-specific roles, characters and their layered relations that constitute the “raw 
materials” that people can enact in different ways through their interactions in any given 
situation at a specific time and place.  
 
Institutional logics, situational experience and the transformative role of interactions 
Although institutional logics contribute to the formation of a person’s situational 
experience via the processes described above, they do not fully determine the social 
interactions taking place in a given situation. This is because the relationship between 
situational experience and actual interactions can be, and often is, loosely coupled. 
Situational experience provides signposts to guide and evaluate actual interactions through 
connected role and character frames, but it cannot fully encompass the many contingencies 
and the “bizarre potentials” of actual social interactions in the real world. What analytical 
tools can we then use to understand the loosely-coupled relationship between institutional 
logics, situational experience and actual interactions in a given social situation?  
It is useful to start from a dynamic conception of social interaction, such as that 
provided by Strauss (1993)’s definition of interaction as ‘acting toward others’ when ‘others 
in turn act toward, or respond to, the actions of the first actor’ (p. 22). This definition puts at 
centre stage the relational nature of interaction as something that happens between two or 
more people and that, as such, should consider both a person’s actions and people’s reactions 
to those actions. This view is perhaps best encapsulated by Berger and Luckmann (1966):   
“In the face-to-face situation the other is appresented to me in a vivid present shared by both 
of us…….As a result, there is a continuous interchange of my expressivity and his [sic]. I see 
him smile, then react to my frown by stopping the smile, then smiling again as I smile, and so 
on. Every expression of mine is oriented towards him, and vice versa….To be sure, I may 
misinterpret some of these symptoms. I may think that the other is smiling while in fact he is 
smirking” (p. 43 [added]).  
 
From the perspective outlined here, any action and reaction occurring in a given 
situation does not occur in an ‘institutional vacuum’ but will be interpreted by the interactants 
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through the role and character frames constituting the institutionally-specific type of situation 
that they think they are in. As discussed above, through socialization people learn to 
recognize the different, institutionally-specific, typified situations characterizing different 
institutional orders. For example, when interacting with a police officer, a person recognizes 
the current situation as a typified situation within the institutional order of the state, 
constituted by certain role and character frames (e.g. the role of the citizen conventionally 
enacted through characters displaying unquestioning obedience and deference). These 
institutionally-specific situational frames do not univocally determine the interpretations of, 
and reactions to, a given action. But they delimit the space of possibilities for interpreting and 
responding to that action. Thus, a joke made by a police officer while arresting a convict may 
be interpreted very differently (e.g. as act of kindness to defuse the tension of the moment or 
as an abuse of her/his authority over the convict), but it can only be interpreted in relation to 
the roles and characters constituting the institutionally-specific type of situation (i.e. coerced 
arrest of a convict by a state official) in which that action occurs.  
While multiple roles and characters are available in any situation depending on the 
type of situation and the interactants’ embeddedness in multiple institutions, only a limited 
subset of these characters and roles will ultimately be sustained over the duration of an 
interaction. These characters and roles may eventually become mutually ratified and thus 
dominate the interaction, shaping the behaviour of the interactants and leaving more durable 
marks on their identities, goals and schemas. Which roles and characters will become 
dominant for which interactant will largely depend on the process of interaction itself. This is 
why we need a more granular conception of the interaction process than that afforded by the 
over-simplified stimulus-response model underlying identity verification theory (Stryker and 
Burke, 2000) and the TOL model. To take seriously the inter-active relational nature of 
interaction, we need to unpack the often non-linear ways in which interactions unfold, 
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understanding their dynamic and potentially transformative properties. While a full model of 
interaction dynamics is outside the space limits of this article, I outline below two key 
insights about the interaction process drawing from micro-interactionist research.  
First, the interaction process itself has been usefully conceptualized by Randall 
Collins (2004) as an interaction ritual –i.e. a “mechanism of mutually focused emotion and 
attention producing a momentarily shared reality, which thereby generates solidarity and 
symbols of group membership” (Collins, 2004: 7). Interaction rituals are produced when 
social interactions between two or more people create mutual attention and shared emotional 
energy among them. When that happens, interactants are likely to interact again in the future 
and the positive emotions are likely to be carried over to the next interaction episodes as 
“traces” of past interactions (Collins, 2004). From this perspective, shared emotional energy 
and mutual attention are mechanisms through which different patterns of interactions can 
become sustained over time or rather fade out over the course of an episode of interaction. If 
a given interaction pattern –intended as an interlocking of actions and reactions- produces 
shared emotional energy and mutual attention among interactants in a given situation, that 
pattern is more likely to become sustained.  
Since an interaction expresses the performance of certain roles and characters by 
interactants, this also helps explaining which roles and characters (out of the many that any 
person can play in a situation) may become dominant and sustained in a social situation. The 
roles and characters that will end up generating higher levels of emotional energy and mutual 
attention through the social interactions displaying them are the ones which are more likely to 
dominate the situation and shape peoples’ situated behaviour. For example, Furnari and 
Rolbina (2018) show that producers in TV and music projects enact their role through 
different styles (i.e. characters), but only some of these styles become charged with emotional 
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energy and mutual attention, thus facilitating the reproduction of certain patterns of 
interaction at the project level. 
 The second insight for conceptualizing the process of interaction comes from 
Goffman (1974: 40-82)’s description of different processes of keyings –i.e. intended as 
different ways in which situational frames can be transferred by continuing to conduct the 
same activity but in a different manner (e.g. transforming work into play or less serious 
work). Through different forms of keyings, a person can loosen up the link between roles and 
characters that is socially ratified in institutionally specific types of situations.  
Both interaction rituals and keyings are two useful ways of presenting the 
spontaneous, emergent and potentially transformative properties of situated social interaction. 
More empirical and theoretical work is needed to systematically compare and theorize these 
properties of situated interactions across different types of situations.  
 
Discussion  
In this essay, I offer a conceptualization of social situations that strengthens the 
connection between institutional logics and people’s lived experience of ‘being in a social 
situation’, a key part of people’s everyday life experience. I argue that situational experience 
can be usefully conceptualized as a gestalt of two layered situational frames: role frame and 
character frame. Institutional logics shape the content taken by these frames in the different 
typified situations characterizing different institutional orders. Via situational frames, logics 
condition but do not determine the social interactions taking place in a specific social 
situation occurring at a given time and place. Whether social interactions reproduce the 
existing institutionally-specific situational frames or transform them largely depends on the 
process of situated interaction itself. This conceptualization of social situations contributes to 
the development of more robust institutional micro-foundations in the following ways. 
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Implications for research on the micro-foundations of institutional logics  
 To research on the micro-foundations of institutional logics, I contribute a theory of 
social situations that allows to explain where situational experience comes from and how this 
experience is shaped by institutional logics in a non-deterministic, non-functionalist way. The 
cornerstone of this theory is Goffman (1974)’s insight that social situational experience is a 
complex gestalt of layered frames that are culturally defined and thus historically variant 
(Diehl and McFarland, 2010). I further develop this insight by arguing that situational frames 
are shaped by the logics regulating the different institutional orders in which people are 
socialized through the course of their life. I identify socialization into different orders as a 
key mechanism by which institutionally-specific situational experience is built and I show 
such experience shapes actual social interactions taking place in any given time and place. 
Thus, my main contribution to research on the micro-foundation of institutional logics is to 
conceptualize situational experience as endogenous to, and conditioned by, institutional 
orders and their associated logics4. 
Future research should productively unpack further the situated learning processes (e.g. 
Lave and Wenger, 1991) through which people learn logics as ‘situational gestalts’ rather 
than as chunks of modular or nearly-decomposable knowledge, as assumed by the cognitivist 
model underlying the TOL model of micro-foundations. The arguments put forward here 
encourage the use of theoretical perspectives such as situated learning and symbolic 
interactionism to build more solid micro-foundations. Differently from cognitive psychology 
theories which put at centre stage the individual, these perspectives highlight the social 
situation as a key unit of analysis. This focus is more consistent with the foundational 
                                                             
4 This does not equal to say that social situations are endogenous to logics because such 
situations are composed not only by situational experience but also by actual social 
interactions, which are partially autonomous from logics, as I have argued above. 
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statements of the institutional logics perspective (Friedland and Alford, 1991), which 
advocated for overcoming both the methodological individualism characteristic of rational 
choice theories and the structural functionalism of neo-institutional theories. More generally, 
future research can also address the assumptions underlying the imagery of multiple levels of 
analysis underlying the TOL model, rooted in Coleman (1990)’s so-called bath-tube model. 
While the fundamental assumption underlying that model is that social reality can be 
productively studied through multiple levels of analysis, research in relational sociology 
(Emirbayer, 1997) and practice theory (Nicolini, 2016) has challenged such premise, 
considering the fruitfulness of a flat, relational ontology that “suggests that all social 
phenomena, small scale and large-scale, are constituted and experienced in terms of ‘micro’ 
situations” (Nicolini, 2016: 4). The areas of overlap between the Goffman-inspired, 
institutional analysis of social situations outlined here and a relational ontology constitutes a 
promising area for future research. 
 
Implications for the inhabited institutions approach and the study of social interactions 
My main contribution to the inhabited institutions approach and the study of social 
interaction is to link social situations with institutional logics by identifying situational 
frames and their institutional content as one source of social situations’ institutional 
specificity. Particularly, I identify situational frames as an important constitutive component 
of social situations and argue that people’s socialization into these frames crucially links 
institutional logics and social situations. This approach differs from the conventional 
symbolic interactionism approach to the study of social situations and situated interaction 
(e.g. Blumer, 1986; see also Gonos, 1977). 
While symbolic interactionism tends to see every social situation as unique and 
idiosyncratic, following Goffman (1974) I have argued that different social situations can be 
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compared analytically along some common dimensions (i.e. situational frames) which are 
constitutive of any situation. This analytic, comparative approach had already allowed 
researchers to see how situational frames vary historically (Diehl and McFarland, 2010). I 
add to this historically comparative approach an explicit institutional focus by illustrating 
how situational frames can also vary across institutional orders, thus embodying the different 
principles and prescriptions of different institutional logics. By doing so, I follow Diehl and 
McFarland (2010)’s call to theorize social situations by leveraging “the specific knowledge of 
the large sociocultural context within which the situation takes place” (p. 1730).  
My institutional approach to social situations differs from the particularism and 
empiricism of symbolic interactionism because it allows researchers to identify different 
“typified situations” that vary in the institutional content embedded in situational frames. 
These typified situations distinctively characterize the major institutional orders constituting 
society (i.e. religion, state, democracy, profession, market, professions, community) in 
different historical periods. At the same time, I retain important insights from symbolic 
interactionism and its commitment “to appreciate more fully the "indeterminacy," of social 
life” (Gonos, 1977: 856) by drawing an analytical distinction between situational experience 
and the situated interactions that actually take place in social situations. This perspective is 
therefore largely compatible with symbolic interactionism and its appreciation of the rich 
texture of situations but attempts to re-balance this approach by also appreciating the 
institutional background against which situated interactions are understood. From this 
perspective, institutions and situations are co-implicated in social interaction, they are 
mutually co-instituted through social interaction. People learn what institutions are and what 
logics govern them through situated interaction. In most cases, situated interactions reproduce 
the expected patterns of interaction inscribed in situational frames shaped by logics, but they 
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always retain a transformative potential to re-shape and modulate existing situational frames 
in unexpected and variegated ways.  
Relatedly, the approach outlined in this essay differs from cognitive-oriented 
“situationalism” (Ross and Nisbett, 1991) because it focuses on the institutional aspects of 
situations –i.e. on how situational experience and situational frames are constituted and 
learned through institutional logics via socialization. In that sense, I advocate an institutional 
analysis of situations. Such situational-cum-institutional perspective contributes to the 
inhabited institutions approach (e.g. Hallett & Meanwell, 2016; Leibel, Hallett and Bechky, 
2017) by highlighting the importance of situational experience (and its constitutive situational 
frames) as the background against which people understand their social interactions as 
meaningful. Thus, if the inhabited institutions approach underscores that institutions “acquire 
their significance” via situated interactions (Hallett and Ventresca, 2006: 213), this essay 
unpacks a key source of situated interactions’ significance.  
Future research should enrich this discussion by considering different types of 
situational frames beyond the two examined here (role frame and character frame), including 
different types of natural frames such as the body frame (Merleau-Ponty, 1964) or the space 
frame (Lefebrve, 1991) as well as the person frame considered by Diehl and McFarland 
(2010). Not only different types of situational frames require more empirical and theoretical 
attention, but also their layered relations and their historical variation in connection with 
institutional logics. For example, scholars may develop new models or ideal-types of 
institutional logics that can specify for each institutional order, not only organizing principles 
such as the source of legitimacy and control, but also the types of situational frames and 
typified situations that those logics imply, thus responding to the call for developing new 
ways to represent and measure logics (Ocasio, Thornton, Lounsbury, 2017). Relatedly, while 
I built mostly on Goffman (1974)’s later work on frames, future research can productively 
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build on his earlier works (e.g.  Goffman, 1959; 1967) which focus more on what I called 
here the second “component” of social situations –i.e. actual social interactions- exploring the 
how in situ interaction dynamics may conform or transform institutional logics’ prescriptions.  
 
Conclusion  
More than two decades ago, Friedland and Alford (1991) developed the notion of 
institutional logic with an ambitious micro-foundational agenda: overcome both trans-
historical (e.g. rational choice theories) and over-socialized deterministic models of 
individual behaviour (e.g. structural functionalist theories) by considering the mutually 
constitutive relationship between institutions and individuals. Key to this agenda was the 
insight that individual action is both material and symbolic. This essay constitutes a small 
step towards that ambitious goal by conceptualizing social situations as a key micro-
foundation of institutional logics and theorizing the inter-connectedness of their symbolic 
(situational frames) and material (situated interactions) components. By doing so, I show the 
limitations of purely cognitive or socio-cognitive psychological theories to provide adequate 
micro-foundations and the value of sociological theories of situated micro-interaction to 
overcome such limitations.  
 
Acknowledgements 
I thank the editors of this volume, particularly Lauri Wessel, and an anonymous reviewer for 
providing highly valuable comments on an earlier version of this essay. For very helpful 
comments and encouragement during the revision of the essay, I also thank Daniel Beunza, 
Henri Schildt and Mike Lounsbury.  
 
 
24 
 
References 
Berger, P. L., & Luckmann, T. 1966. The social construction of reality: A treatise in the 
sociology of knowledge. Hammondsworth: Penguin Books. 
 
Blumer, H. (1986). Symbolic interactionism: Perspective and method. Univ of California 
Press. 
 
Coleman, J. S. (1990). Foundations of social theory. Harvard university press. 
 
Collins, R. 2004. Interaction ritual chains. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
 
Diehl, D., & McFarland, D. (2010). Toward a historical sociology of social 
situations. American Journal of Sociology, 115(6), 1713-1752. 
 
Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a relational sociology . American Journal of Sociology, 
103(2), 281-317.  
 
Friedland, R., Alford, R. R. 1991. Bringing Society Back in: Symbols, Practices, and 
Institutional Contradictions. Pp. 232-266 in The New Institutionalism in Organizational 
Analysis, edited by Powell, W.W., DiMaggio, P.J. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
 
Furnari, S. (2014). Interstitial spaces: Microinteraction settings and the genesis of new 
practices between institutional fields. Academy of Management Review, 39(4), pp. 439–462 
 
Furnari, S. & Rolbina, M. (2018). Brokerage Styles and Interaction Rituals in Creative 
Projects: Towards an Interactionist Perspective on Brokerage. Research in the Sociology of 
Organizations, 55, pp. 17–45. 
 
Goffman, E. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. 
 
Goffman E.  1961. Asylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other 
Inmates. New York: Anchor. 
 
Goffman E.  1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs, 
N.J.: Prentice-Hall.  
 
Goffman E. 1967. Interaction Ritual. New York: Anchor Books.  
 
Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. Harvard 
University Press 
 
Gonos, G. (1977). " Situation" versus" Frame": The" Interactionist" and the" Structuralist" 
Analyses of Everyday Life. American Sociological Review, 854-867. 
 
Gray, B., Purdy, J. M., & Ansari, S. (2015). From interactions to institutions: Microprocesses 
of framing and mechanisms for the structuring of institutional fields. Academy of Management 
Review, 40(1), 115-143.  
 
Hallett, T. 2010. The Myth Incarnate: Recoupling Processes, Turmoil, and Inhabited 
Institutions in an Urban Elementary School. American Sociological Review. 75, 1: 52-74.  
25 
 
 
Hallett, T, Ventresca, M. 2006. Inhabited Institutions: Social Interactions and Organizational 
Forms in Gouldner's Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy. Theory and Society, 35: 216-236.  
 
Hallett, T., Meanwell. E. 2016. "Accountability as an Inhabited Institution: Contested 
Meanings and the Symbolic Politics of Reform." Symbolic Interaction 39(3): 374-396.  
 
Hochschild, Arlie. 1985. Managed Heart: Commercialization of Human Feeling. Berkeley: 
University of California Press. 
 
Lave, J., Wenger, E. (1991) Situated Learning. Legitimate peripheral participation,. 
Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press 
 
Lefebvre, H. (1991) The Production of Space,  Oxford: Basil Blackwell.  
 
Leibel, E., Hallett, T., & Bechky, B. A. (2018). Meaning at the source: The dynamics of field 
formation in institutional research. Academy of Management Annals, 12(1), 154-177.  
 
Lok, J., Creed, W. E. D., DeJordy, R., & Voronov, M. (2017). Living institutions: Bringing 
emotions into organizational institutionalism. The Sage handbook of organizational 
institutionalism, 691-620. 
 
Lounsbury, M. & Crumley, E. T. 2007. New practice creation: An institutional perspective on 
innovation. Organization Studies, 28(7): 993-1012. 
 
March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (2010). Rediscovering institutions. Simon and Schuster. 
 
McCall, G., Simmon, J. 1978. Identities and Interactions. New York. Free Press.  
 
McPherson, C. & M. Sauder. 2013. Logics in Action: Managing Institutional Complexity in a  
Drug Court. Administrative Science Quarterly, 20 (10): 1-32. 
 
Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 1964. Signs. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press. 
 
Merton, Robert. 1957. “The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory.” British Journal 
of Sociology 8 (2): 106–20. 
 
Nicolini, Davide (2016) Is small the only beautiful? Making sense of 'large phenomena' from 
a practise-based perspective. In: Hui , A. and Schatzki, T. and Shove, E., (eds.) The Nexus of 
Practices Connections : constellations, practitioners. London ; New York: Routledge, pp. 98-
113.  
 
Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1991). Person and the Situation: Perspectives of Social 
Psychology.New York. McGraw-Hill 
 
Ocasio, W., Thornton, P. & Lounsbury, M. (2017). Advances to the institutional logics 
perspective. In R. GreenwoodC. Oliver & T. B. Lawrence The SAGE Handbook of 
organizational institutionalism, 2nd ed.: London: Sage. (pp. 509-531).  
 
Pache, A. C., & Santos, F. (2013). Embedded in hybrid contexts: How individuals in 
26 
 
organizations respond to competing institutional logics. Research in the Sociology of 
Organizations Emerald Group Publishing Limited. (pp. 3-35).  
 
Scheff, T.. 1990. Microsociology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Simon, H. A. (1955). A behavioral model of rational choice. The quarterly journal of 
economics, 69(1), 99-118. 
 
Smets, M., Aristidou, A., & Whittington, R. 2017. Towards a practice-driven institutionalism. 
In R. Greenwood, C. Oliver, T. B. Lawrence, & R. Meyer (Eds.), The Sage handbook of 
organizational institutionalism, 2nd ed.: London: Sage. (pp. 384-411). 
 
Strauss, A. L. (1993). Continual permutations of action. Routledge, London. 
 
Stryker, S., & Burke, P.J. 2000. The past, present, and future of an identity theory. Social 
Psychology Quarterly, 63: 284-297.  
 
Effler, E. S. (2010). Laughing saints and righteous heroes: Emotional rhythms in social 
movement groups. University of Chicago Press. 
 
Thornton, P.H., & Ocasio, W. 1999. Institutional logics and the historical contingency of power 
in organizations: Executive succession in the higher education publishing industry, 1958–1990. 
American Journal of Sociology, 105: 801–843. 
 
Thornton, P., Ocasio, W., & Lounsbury, M. 2012. The Institutional Logics Perspective. Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Voronov, M., & Weber, K. (2016). The heart of institutions: Emotional competence and 
institutional actorhood. Academy of Management Review, 41(3), 456-478. 
 
Weber, K., & Glynn, M.A. 2006. Making sense with institutions: Context, thought, and action 
in Karl Weick’s theory. Organization Studies, 27(11): 1639-60. 
 
Zietsma, C., & Toubiana, M. (2018). The Valuable, the Constitutive, and the Energetic: 
Exploring the impact and importance of studying emotions and institutions. Organization 
Studies, on-line in press. 
